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OPINION
OF THE

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
IN 'l'HE CASE OF

ELISHA BAXTER
vs.

J OSEPH BROO KS.
NOVEM:B E R

TERM:, 1874.

LITTLE ROCK,
P JUN' T ~D AT TRIC GAZETTE ROOK AND .TO R PRlST.TNG OFFICE,

1875.

STATE OF J\_Rl(ANSAS.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.

ELISHA BAXTER\ On
vs.

(
(

JOSEPH BROOKS)

certiorari to quash the judgment of Pulaski Circuit Court
decl aring Brnoks Governor of
Arkansas.

On the twelfth day of November, 1874, plaintiff presented
his petition to one of the Judges of thi s Co urt, in which he
averred ltbat defendant, Oil the six teenth day of Jun e, 1873,
brought his action at law in the Pul aski Circuit Court again st
plaintiff. In his co mplaint in said action, defendant allegecl :
That on the fifth clay of November, 1872, at a general election held on that day in the State of Arkansa, pursuant to th e
Constituti on and laws of sa id State, fl')r the election, among
other officers, of the Governor of the State for the term of fo ur
years from th e fi,·st day of Janu ary, 1873, sa id J oseph Brooks
received the hig hest number of lega l votes cast at said election
for th e office of Governor aforesaid, etc.
That the said Jose ph Brooks was in all respects lega lly qualified for said~office- stating th e facts which brought him witbiu
the constituti onal req uirements as to eligibil ity-and was entitled t-0 be placed in possession thereof, and to en ter upon the
discharge of the duti es of the same.
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That on the se venth day of J anuary, 1873, E lisha Baxter
usurped the said office of Governor, ~.nd from thence until the
commencement of said action unlawfu lly withheld the same
from said Joseph Brooks, and received the salary, fees and
emolum ents pertain ing to said office, amounting to the sum of
three thousand dollars; and in and by said compla in t it was
prayed that, by the judgment of said Circuit Court, tbe said
Eli ha Baxter be ousted from tbe office of Governor; and that
tbe said Joseph Brooks be declared entitled thereto, and pl aced
in possession of the same, and be al o have judg ment against
the said Elisha Baxter for tb e salary, etc.
After thus reciting the contents of the complaint of J oseph
Brooks, plaintiff, in his petition, furth er averred :
That he appeared to sa id action, and demurred to the complaint, beca use it appeared upon the face of said complaint that
th~ said Circu it Uo urt bad no jurisd ictio11 of the subject of said
action; whereupon said Circuit Court over ruled said dem urrer,
and rendered against said Elisha Baxter judgment of ouster
from said office of Governor, and also judgment for the sum of
two thousand two hun clt·ed <tnd eighteen dollars, with interest
thereon at the rate of six per cent. per annum from date of said
judgment, with cost. And tbe said Circuit Court further adjudged that the said Jose ph Brooks was ent itled to the said
office of Governor, and all books, papers and other appurtenances th ereto belonging, by virtue of the election in sai d complaint mentioned .
The plaintiff claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction, and
that its judgment was void, but the sa me being of record in
th e Circuit Court ot Pula. ki county, and will, as he beli eved,
be used as a pretext for furth er attempts to barrass and injure
bim, prays fo r a writ of certiorari, and that tbe proceedin gs
and judgment of the Pulas ki Circui t Cou rt be quashed.
A duly certified copy of tb e record of the proceedings and
judgment of the Circuit Court of Pulaski co unty. includ ing a
copy of all tbe origina l papers, is attached to this petition, and
fully sustains its statements. On the above mentioned day the
writ was ord ered by the Hon. William M. Harrison, to whom
the application was made.
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In response to this writ, the Clerk of sa id Circuit Court l:as
returned a foll and complete transcript of the record in said
cause; which, in every particular, correspo nds with the transcript exhibited with the petition.
The record before as shows that the Comt below allowed the
counsel of Brooks to submit the demmrer of Baxter, in tbe
absence of h is counsel, and decided the question in thei r absence; an d instead of overruling the demmrer and requ iring
Ba xter to answer, and giving him a right to deny the statements of the petition, and to a trial of the issue as directed by
tbe Code of Practice of this State, reudered a fina l judgment
ousting Baxter from the office of Governor. and for two thousand two hundred and eighteeu dollars. How the Court
arrived at this exact sum does not appear, a,i there was no
regular assessment either by con rt or jury; and if the complaint
was regarded as confessed, as tbe record states that tbe Cou_rt
held it to be, on the demurrer, for the purpose of ousting the
GovernQr, we caa not see how it failed to find three t housand
doll ars as the sum due for salary and emoluments, for that fact
was as distinctly stated in Brooks' petition as any other allega. tioo in it.
Baxte,·, on the 16th April, 1874, filed his motion to eorrect
th e entry of 15th 0f Ap,-il, which stated tbat tbe parties appeared, so as to have it appea,· that Baxter was not present by
counsel or in person, when h is demurrer was submitted; also;
a motion to set aside the judgment, on several distinct grounds.
First-Tbe demurrer of defendant to plaintiff's compla int
was called up by the plai □ tiff's counsel aDd submitted in the
absence, and without the knowledge or copseut of tbe counsel
of Baxter.
Second-The demurrer was called up and submitted on a
day oth er than the day fixed by the rul es of the Court for raking
up and argui ng demurrers aDd motions, and on a day when
defendant's coun el had no rea8on to suppose it could, or would
be taken up, and wb en one of them was confi ned to his bed
with severe illness.
Third-Th e counse l of the defendant understood the Cou rt
to announce from the bench on S>Lturday last (that is, the Sat-
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urday before the Monday on which the case was called np and
submitted by Brooks' counse l e:i: parte), that inasmuch as the
Federal Court would be in session the then com in g week, no
cases would be called during t he wN•k, in th e absence of cou11sel engaged rn the Federa l Court, hence the co un sel of defendant havi ng business in the Federal Court, did not dee m it
necessary to attend this court, to look after t his, or any otber
cases in which they were retnined, and were absent wh en said
demurrer was called up and su bmitted, nn d wh en the final
judgment was rendered.
Fourth-On the overruling of the dell)urrer the court proceeded at once to enter final jud.,ment, wheu the judg ment
should have been that the dtfcndant answe,·.
Fifth- The court rendered a fina l judgment on overruling
the demurrer, in the absence of the cou nsel for defen dant, and
without giving the defendant any time or opportunity or
opti on to answer.
Sixth-The court proceeded to assess damages and vender a
money judgment against defendan t without any proper submission to the court, or a j ury to ascer ta in th e damages on
proof.
Seventh-The court had no jurisdiction of the subj ect matter of tbe su it, etc.
On th e 17th day of April, 1874, was made the fo ll owing
order by the court below in the case:
"And now comes the plaintiff' by his attorney, and the motion of the said defe □ dant to correct a record entry in this case
heretofore filed, coming on to be heard, and tile court being of
opini on that the said ,·ecord entry shou ld be amended, it is
ord ered that the same be amended so as to read as follows:
"And now comes the plaintiff by his attorn ey, and th is case
being subject to call by the plaint,if, and it appea rin g to the
court defendant by his allomt ys was consenting to the subm ission of tlie demurrer of the defendant to the complai nt of the
plaintiff herein, the same is submitted to the court a □ d by th e
cou rt taken u □ der advisement, and t he motion of defenda nt
heretofore filed herein to set aside the judgment heretofore rendered in this cause is by the court overruled ."
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As lo how the fact appears tbat uefendant wa;; consenting to
the subm ission of bis dcmuner, a □ d how plaintiff's counsel procured t he right to submi t defendant's demurrer for him, does
not appear ; us to this, the record is silent. Perhaps the cou rt
omitted to give us all t he facts in the case, which iul:luencccl its
conclusions. Be th is as it m~y, the record showa errors of a
very gross kind; for which, were the case before us in a direct
proceeding, its reversal would he inevitable, however anxious
t be court might feel for the enc,ls of justice, t'l sustain thcj udgmeut. But this is not a direct proceediu11: to reverse, hut is an
appeal to the superi ntending <'Ootrol of this court, aud unl ess
we find a want of jurisd iction owr the subject-matter of th~
liti gation, or excess ot jurisd iction , we can do nothing in th is
mode of proceed ing, and must leave the plaintiff to his remedy
by appeal or writ of error.
Arti cle 7, section 4, of t he Constitution of 1868, under which
thi s ca e arose, provi de that the Supreme Court shall have
general supervision over a ll inferior courts of law and eq uity.
lt shal l have power to issue wrii,s of eno,·,supersedeas, certiorari,
habeas corp us, mandamus, quo warranto and other remed ial
writs, and bea1· and determine the same. :Final judgment iu the
inferior courts may be brought, by writ of error or appeal, into
the Supreme Co urt. The Constitution of 1874 is substantially
the same. Thi s section does not mat erially vary from section 2
of article 6 of the Constit ution of 1836, ofwhicb section 4. article
7 of the Constitution of 1874 is a copy .
In this Constitution the language is "supe1·intending control," and instead of providing for appeal, and writs of en or,
as is prov ided io the Constitution of 1868, it sim ply provides
that, except in cases otherwi se di rected in that Constitution, the
Supreme Court shal l have appe llate jurisdiction only. Both
Constitutious provide in tbe same language for the above-uamed
writ.s. There is no materi al distinction between the three Constitutions. On th is subject they arc substautially id entical.
Under the Constitution of 1836 it has been repeatedly holden
that there was an appe llate jurisdictiou and a 'power of superintending coutrol over inferior courts, and in aid of this jurisdic-
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ti on any one of t he writs named in the Constitut ion mig ht be
invoked; and, although there ha~ been some difference of
opini on as to tbe construction of these two sections in the two
Cocstitutions, to-wit-i n those of 1836 a nd Hl68-as to whether
there was in this court any power to issue any of the named
writ,; iu !lw exercise of an original jurisdiction, there bas been
no difference upon the riu,,:;tinn of supervising or superintend ing
C'Ontrol The construction upon that subject has been uniform
under both Constitutions. We mi g ht, therefore, under tbe Constitution of 1868, as wel I as undet· that of 1836, class t be powers
therein ~iven to this court as ordinary and extraord inary. T he
nrdiuary are invoked by appeal or writ of error; others, wh ich
are extraordinary in the sense that their exercise is unfrequent
and also special, and are invoked whenever one of the specia l
writs named is applicable-as mandamus, certiorari and q uo
warranto, whether issued in the exercise of an appellate or
original jurisdiction.
\Vhere au in fer ior court usurps juri•diction or exceeds t hat
given by the Constitu tion, the jurisdiction of this court may be
invoked in such case to ar rest the proceeding, as was doae in t he .
case of Be,-ry vs. Wheeler, bv writ of prohibition, or after the
in fe ri or court has as,;nmed to render judgment, the jurisd iction
of th is court may be invoked, and the writ of cer tiorari-for
which the Constitution makes provision-may issue to 1·em ove
the case here. Where the Constitution gives a superior, superintending control over an inferior court, autl the law provides
no mode of its exercise, th is is the proper remedy. Carnall vs.
Orawfo,-d County, inf,·a. Io such case tbe Sup 1·eme Court can
only quash or affirm, in the abse ncP. of statutory reg ulations.
The distinction between ordinary and extrao rdinary powers of
t he court was clearly defined in the cases of Woods, e.'l: pa,·te, 3
Ark., 53, and Anthony, ex pcute, 5 A,·k., 358; anil althoug h
t hese cases were overrul ed, the decisions are appl icable to th e
Constitution of 1868, as constr ued in the case of P,-ice & Ba,·ton
vs. P age, 25 Ark. A ud th is matter is fully reviewed, and the·
powers and juris;liction of the co urt, un der the Constitution of
1836, which is lik e that of 1874, fully defined in Oa,-nall vs.

Orawford County, 11 Ark., 604; Marr, ex parte, 12 A rk., 84 ;
A llis, ex parte, 12 Ark., 102; C,-ise, ex parte, 16 A rk., 195;
Good, ex parte, 19 Ark., 411-all of which cases arose under
the Constitution of 1836. The decision under t he Constitution
of 1868 first fo llowed these (see Jones vs. Little Rock, 25 Ark. ,
284), and afterward, in the case of P,·ice & B arton vs. Page, 25
Ark., 527, it was held that the Constitution of 1836 and that of
1868 were different in this : that t hat of 1836 prohibited all
original j ur isd iction in this court, while that of 1868 did not,
and therefore th is court cou ld take original jurisdiction whenever th e writs named were the appropriate legal remedy. But
upon this q uestion of superintending control there has never
been any difference in the construction of th e two Constitutions.
I t bas been hold en t.hat where there is no jurisdiction in the
infer ior cour t, there can be none hy appeal to the Supreme
Court. L atham vs. Jon es, 6 Ark. , 371 ; Collins vs. Woodruff, 9
· Ark., 463 ; P endleton vs. Fowler, 6 Ark., 41 ; L evy vs. She:rman,
6 A rk., 182; Ashley vs. B razil, l Ark., 144.
Where t here is a want of jurisdiction or an excess, the remedy
soug ht in this case is tbe a ppropriate, if not tb e only remedy.
An a ppea l would not be proper. Ashley vs. Brazil, l A,·k., 144;
People vs. Judges of Suffolk, 24 Wend. , 252. Certiorari is the
proper remedy where there bas been an excess of j urisdiction,
a pparent on the face of the record-if it has to be made out by
coll ateral facts, t he writ does not lie. Ex parte JJ[ayor of
Albany, 23 Wend., 277; Rex vs. Somersetshin J«stices, 6 Dow/.
& Ry!., 469; 5 B. & C,·ess, 816; Queen vs. I nha&itanl.s of Westham, 10 Mod. 159; Buckner, ex parte, 4 Eng. (9 A1·k.) Rep., 73.
This last case was overruled in Marr, ex parte, 12 Ark., 84,
onl y so fa r as it held that au appl,ication mig ht be made d irect
to this cour t, instead of applying to the Circuit Court. But
this court bas never overruled the principle anno unced in
B uckner, ex pa,·te: that where a co urt exceeds i ~~ ju risdiction,
its acts are void, and its proceedings may, upon appl ication to
the proper tribunal, be removed by certiorari and q uashed. A
cer ti~rari will not lie from this co urt to correct errors of au

,.
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inferior court which could have been corrected on appe3.l.
Allston, ex parte, 17 Ark., 580.
The superintend ing control of this court over the Circuit
Court, and the power to arrest its action by prohibition, or
quash its judgment on ce rtiorari where it usurps jurisdi ction, is
indisputable.
The remaining inquiry, which wi ll dispose of th is case, is:
Had tb e court below jurisd iction of the subj ect matter of this
suit?
The proceedings in this case in tbe court below were based
upon the twelfth chapter of the Civi l Code, for repealing or
vacating charters, and preventing th e usurpation of an office
or franchise, and is especially based upon section 525 of the
Civil Coile, which section forms a part of said chapter, and is
as follows: " Whenever a person usurps an office or franchise
to which be is not entitl ed by law, an action by proceedings at
law may be instituted against him, either by the State or the
party entitled to the office or franchise, to prevent the usurper
from exercising the office or franchi se." Under this section Mr.
Brooke, claiming to be entitled to the office of Governor, instituted suit in his own name against Baxter in the Pulaski
Circuit (',ourt.
The 19th section of artide 6 of the Constitution of 1868 provides that the returns of every election for Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, AttorneyGeneral and Superintendent of Public Instruction, shall be
sealed up and transm itted to the seat of government by the
returning officers, and directed to th e pres iding officer of the
Senate, who, durin g the first week of th e session, shall open
and publish the same in the presence of the members then
assembled. The persons hayin g the highest number of votes
shall be declared elected ; but if two or more shall have the
highest and equal number of votes for the same office, one of
them shall be chosen by joint vote of both houses. Contested
elections shall likewise be determin ed by both houses of the
General Assembly in such manner as is or may hereafter be
prescribed by law.;'

Now here is a tribunal established by th e Constitution to try
contested elections for Governor. If that tribunal bad exclusive jurisdiction over contested elections for Governor, it
will scarcely be contend ed by any one that the Circuit Court
of Pulaski county bad jurisd iction of this case; for the complaint claims to be nothing else than a dispute as to th e result
announced in tbe canvass of the vote for Governor in 1872. If
the creation of a tribunal before wh ich such contests are to be
beard establishes an exclnsive jurisdiction, then the Legislature
will not be presum ed to have intended to include the officers
named in the Constitution in that behalf in th e provisions of
chapter 12, Civil Code. For then, as to the officers named,
the only subject left within legislati ve control by the Constitution was to prescribe the mode of bearing the contestants,
conducting its deliberations and of announ cing its conolusion.
As to the question who sbal! compose the tribunal, and bow it
should be chosen and organized, tbe Constitution itself had
eettled-tbe two houses of the General Assembly.
The law in force, at the adoption of th e Constitution of 1868,
which was adopted by that Constitu tion and continued in force,
was found in chapter 62, sections 100 and 101, Gould's Digest.
The same provision has been carried into th e ·new Digest just
published. See Gantt's Digest, sections 2379, 2380, et seq.
This statute fully prescribes the method of cond ucting such
contests before both houses in joint meeting, provides bow the
case shall be brought before them, and bow notice shall be
given and proof taken, etc., and is fu ll and minute in all the
details of the investigation. But without any law to regulate
the proceedings in such case before the General Assembly, the
jurisd iction of the case would remain there, if it is exclusi ve.
The mere failure on the part of the L egislature to provide a
mode of conducting the trial would no more oust tbe jurisd iction than a fail ure to establish laws govern in g actions before
Justices of the Peace, or Probate Courts would destroy th eir
constituti onal jurisdiction and give the power to bestow it
somewhere else, by a simple enactm ent. Consti tutions would
be worth but little, if they could be thus evaded.
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Is the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution exclusive?
This court held in the case of Attorney-General on the relation of Brooks vs. Baxter (Mss. Op. 1873) : that the jurisdiction thus conferred by the Constitution on the General
Assembly was exclCisive, and that neither this nor any other
State cou rt had jurisdiction to try a suit in relation to such
contest, be the mode or form what it might, whether at the
suit of the Attorney-General, or on 1·elation of the claimant
through him, or by an individual alone claiming a right to
the office; that eucb issue should be made before the General
Assembly, and that no other tribunal could determ ine the
question.
In the case last cited, the very right which Brooks claimed
in this case came up in his relation through the AttorneyGen eral, and this decision not only decided the question involved here, but decided the very case; and the institution of
this proceeding, after such an announcement in this court,
seems to us au effort to get an i uferior court to revi ew the
decision of a superior, or at least au attempt through the inferior
court to get the question again before this court. If this cou rt
bad even erred ·in tbe first instance, its decision became the law
of the case, which cou ld never be disturbed or overruled in this
case. Jones, ex parte, 2 A1·k., 93; P oi·ler vs. Doe, 10 A1·k., 186.
The decision of this court, wheth er right or wrong, is t he
law of th e case, and the mandate upon the Circu it Court is
obligatory. Pulaski County vs. Lincoln, 13 .Ark., 103; Rector
vs. Danley, 14 A,·k., 304; Hubbard vs. Welch, 11 Ark., 151;
B1·ooks vs. H anaue,·, 22 A1·k., 176.
·we might here content ourselves to rest this case. But 11s
the question has been much discussed, and our conclusion may
be disputed, we will be pardoned for enterin g into a fuller di s•
cussion of the reasons for concurring in the opinion heretofore
delivered by the former court.
Mr. Berry, who ran for Auditor on the same ticket with Mr.
Brooks, instituted proceed ings in the Pulasl,i Circuit Court,
under the provisions of t he same section of the Code under
which this case was instituted. Wheeler appli ed to this court
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by petition for writ of prohibition against the Circuit Judge,
to arrest bis action in the case. In that case the question here
involved was again presented to this court, and was decided in
the same manner, and the writ of prohibition was ord ered,
See Wheeler vs. Whytocl,, MSS. opi ni on, 1873, cited in note to
Gantt's Digest, page 477.
The office of Governor does not exist by virtue of t he common law. It is a creation of the Constitution. And it is well
eettled th at where a new right, or the means of acquirin g it, is
conferred by a constitution or a statute, and an adeq uate remedy
is given by the same authority, wh ich created t he right, parties
injured a,·e confined to the red ress thus given. The State vs.
the relation of G,·e.,el/ vs. Ma,·low, 15 Ohio Stale Rep., 114;
Smith vs. Lockwood, 13 Barbour, 209; Dudley vs. Mahew, 3
Comsl., 9 ; Sedgwick on Stat. and Cons. Law, 94; Com. on relation of Attorney-Geneml vs. Garrigues, 28 Penn. St. Rep., 9;
Coin. vs. Baxte:i·, 35 Id. , 263; Com. v•. Leech, 44 Id., 332;
Prinde vs. Garter, 1 Hill, S. C., 53.
Th e above cited authorities bear directly upon this question,
and many of them are directly in point and conclusive of the
question.
The case above cited from 15 Ohio Slate Rep. is strongly in
point with th is. There, under provisions simil ar to ou rs,
wherein a specific mode of contestin g elections was provided
by statute accord ing to tbe requirements of the Constitution ,
the Supreme Court of that State decided that this specific
mode alone could be resorted to, to the exclusion of the common
mod e of inqniry by procee,lings in quo warranto.
H on. T. M. Cooley, a d istinguishfd writer upon constitutional Jaw, and one of the law professors in the Un iversity, and
a Jud ge of the Supreme Cou rt of Michigan, in an article in the
International Review (of New York) for January and Febru ary, 1875, fully and ably reviewed this whole question, under
the titl e, "G uara ntee of Order and Republican Government in
the States." At page 74 of said Review, after fully setting
forth his reasons for the conclusion, be uses th is language
"And by the Constitution of Arkansas, t he Legislature bad
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wisely been vested with complete and final authority in the
premises." And in a note Judge Cooley qnotes the provisions
of our Constitution in reference to contested elections for
Governor, and concludes: "To ou r mind there can be no
plausibl e suggestion that the decision of the General Assembly
on such a contest 1s open to judicial review after ward ; but it
may not be inappropriate to refer to G?'ier vs. S hackelford, S. C.
Constitutional R ep., 642 ; Batman vs. Megowan, Mete. Ky. Re-p.,
533; State vs. 1Wa,·low, 15 Ohio State R ep., 134; P eople v•.
Goodwin, 22 Mich . R ep., 496 et al. are in point."
Pending the disturban ces which followed the decision in this,
case, four of the former judges of thi s court assumed to open
this court, notwithstanding the Constitution (Article 7, sec. 3)
provided that it should consist of one ch ief justice and four
a11Sociate justices; and heard an application in behalf of Joseph Brooks vs. H enry P age, State Treasurer, to compel him
to band over money claim ed to have been appropriated for
suppressing insurrections, by an old law on the Statute books
since l 838. To th e statement made in reference to this simulated case, by Attorn ey-General Williams in the opinion
herein referred to, we will add the additional statement that
the old Statute upon which it was assum ed to be based was repealed in 1868, by act approved July 23d of t hat year, as fo llows :
" B e it enacted by the Gene·ral Assembly of the State of Arkan3as,•
" SECTION 1. That all acts and parts of acts makiug appropriatious for any purpose whatever, passed by t he General
Assembly of the State previous to th e first day of January,
Anno Domini 1868, be and the same is hereby repealed.
"SEC. 2. That the amount of, or bal ance remainin g unpaid
under said appropriatious, shall remain in the Treasury of the
State as unappropriated food s until otherwise provided by
law." See Acts of 1868, page 228.
Those four judges ordered t he Treasurer to pay Brooks
money on a statute that bad been repealed nearly six years.
And we will add the further comment, that while the Cooatitutioo of 1836 provided that a majority of the j odgea of this

court should constitute a quorum, that of 1868 required ae
above stated. And although th e Legislature, early after the
organization of the court under th e Constitution of 1868, bad
passed an act authorizing the court to be holden by a majority
of the judges, yet t he members of t he court had, up to this
time, refu sed to open unless they were all present; aud on more
than one occasion had the court been postponed on account of
the absenee of one member. Th e j udges very properly held
that the Constitution havi ng prescribed that the court should
consist of one Chi ef Justice and four Associate Justices, it was
not competent for the Legislatu re to say it should consist of
more or less; and for six years bad the co urt th us acted.
Until this case, there bad been no pretence of authority in four
judges to open the court. Und er the circumstances we would
not be expected to respect this case. But it only assumed to
decid e, in effect, that t he decision of the court below in this
case was enti tled to respect until set aside by this court.
It bas been, also, seriously contended that th e decision of an
inferior court, on the question of its own jurisdiction, is as
conclusive as any other decision unti l reversed. This is the
announcement of a general role without notin g and properly
applying its exceptions.
It is true, as a general rol e, that th e question of jurisdiction
is, prima facie, within the power of every court to determine
for itself, and the decisions of au inferior court, on this question, are, ordi narily, as binding as a ny other decision. Bot to
th is, there are exceptions, as well established as the rule. One
oftbe exceptions to this rul e is, where the w~nt of jurisdiction
appears, as in this case, on. the face of t he proceed ings. In
such case, it is simply void ab initio. State ve. Scott, 1 Baily, 294.
To hold otherwi se woul d be to rn o into the most monstrous absurdities. Suppose th e Cou nty Court of P ulaski countywhich bas jurisdi ction on ly over the fi scal matters, roads, paupers and in tern al affairs of th e county, and has no criminal
jurisdiction wh atever-were to summ on a grand jury, receive
at its bands an indictment for murder, and th ereon proceed, in
the mode prescribed by the Criminal Code, to trial and con-
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viction, and should upon this, sentence tbe person charged with
the crime, to be hun g. la such case the want of jurisdiction
would be apparent on th e face of th e proceedings. Yet if we
lose sight of the except ion above indicated, the sheriff' would
be bound to obey th e county court and hang the man. Suppose he did so, wou ld any court fa il to hold him for the
crime he bad attempted to punish? Would the sentence of
the county court protect him? This is a strong case, and perhaps would never occur ; yet it illustrates the importance of the
exception ; but scarcely more strongly than the case before us,
wherein the court below not only disregard~d a plain provision
of the Constitution , not only went in th e teeth of the decisions
of th is court, twice pronounced, but in one of them a prohibition bad been issued to thi s very judge; and in the other,
the very case before him here, was decided by this court, holding
that neith er this court nor any oth er in th e State had jurisd iction. If such proceed ing as th at is to be respected until set
aside by this court and is to command obedience, even from
th is court, it is difficult to see what stage of insubordination
and assumption of j urisdict.ion would not be eq ually entitled
to obedience and respect.
We cannot better crown tt.is pyramid of authority for the
conclusion we reach than by citing in full th e elaborat ive and
exhaustive opinion of the Attorney-General of the United
States, when this question came before him officially, and
wherein it became bis duty to investi gate it j udicially, and
upon bis opinion the most mom entous action ot the President
of the United States is based; and wh en we remember th at t he
Supreme Court of the Un ited States has repeatedly held that
the decisions of th e political department of the Government on
these questions are final, we cannot overrate their importance.
Luther vs. Borden, 7 Hownrd, l; Rose vs. Himly, 4 Oranch,
241; Kenneit vs. Chambers, 14 Howard, 38 ; D. S. vs. P.robasco, 11 Am. L. R ev., 419. Aside from these considerations,
the position and distinguished ability of the officer, as well as
the conclusive reasoning of the opinion, entit led it to the highest
respect :
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" D F:PAR1',\l~:XT OF J USTICE, \VA S III NGTOX,

May 15, ) 874,

'' To lhP I'resideut :

" Sm : E lisha Baxter, claiming to be Governor of Arkansas,
ha"ing made due application for Executive aid to suppress an
insurrection in that State, a nd Joseph Brooks, cla imin g also to
be Governor of sai d State, having made a similar application,
and these applications havin g been referred by you to me for an
opiouion as to wh ich of t hese two persons is the lawful E xecutive of th e State, I have th e honor to submit : That Baxter
and B rooks were candidates for the office of Governor at a
general election held in Arkansas on the fifth day of N ovember, 1872. Section 19, of Arti cle 6, of the Constitution of
the State provides th at ' th e return s of every election for Governor, L ieutenant-Govern or, Secretary of State Treasurer
Auditor, Attorney-General and Superintendent o;. Public In ~
struction shall be sealed up and transmitted to th e seat of
Govern ment by the return ing officers and directed to th e presid ing officer of t he Senate, wh o during the first ,~eek of th e
session sha ll opcu and p ubli sh the eame in the presence of the
members there assembled.
The person having th e hi ghest
uurn ber of votes shall be declared elected, but if two or more
ohall have the hi ghest and equal number of votes for th e same
offi ce, one ol th em slia ll be chosen by joi11 t vote of both houses.
Co ntested elections sha ll li kewise be determin ed by both houses
of t he General Assembly in such a manner as is or may be
prescri bed by law.'
"Pursuant to t his section th e votes for Governor at the said
electi on were counted, a nd Baxter was declared to be duly
elected. Sa id section, as it will be noticed, after providing fo r
a can vass of t he votes speciall y declares • con tested elections shall
likew ise be deter min ed by both houses of the Gen era l Assembly in such manne1· as is or may hereafter be prescribed by
law.' Wh en this Constitut ion was adopted there was a law in
t he·State, which contin ues in force, prescribin g the mode in
which th e co ntest should be conducted before the General Assembly; the first section of which is as fo ll ow · : 'All contested
elections of Goveruor shall be decided by joint vote of both
3

\
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houses of th e General Assembly, and in such joint meeting the
President of the Senate shall preside.' Brooks accordingly
pre.sea ted to th e lower house of said Assembly his petition for
a contest, but by the decisive vote of sixty-three to nine it was
rej ected by that body. Suboequently the Attorney -Genera l
upon the petitiou of Brooks applied to the Supreme Court of
the State for a q uo warranto to try t he validity of Baxter's
title to the office of Governor, in which it was alleged that
Baxter was a usurper, etc. That court denied the application
upon the ground that the courts of the State had no ri ght to
hea r and determine the question pre5ented, because exclusive
jurisdiction in such cases had been conferred upon the General
Assembly by the Constitution and laws of the State. Brooks
then brought suit sgainst Baxter in the Pulaski Circuit Court,
und er section 525 of the Civil Code of Arkansas, which reads
as follows : ' Whenever a person usurps an office or franchise to
whi ch he is not entiled by law an action by proceedings at law
may be instituted against him either by the State or the party
entitled to the offi ce or fran chi se, to prevent the usurper from
exercising the office or franchise.' Brooks ~tated in bis petition
that be received more than 45,000 votes, and that Baxter received less than 30,000 votes for Governor at the said election,
and after declarin g that Baxter had usurped th e office, prays
that it mav he given to him by t he judgment of th e court, and
that he m~y recover the sum of $2000, the emoluments of said
office withheld from him by Bax ter. This presented to the
court the simpl e question of a contest for th e offi ce of Governor.
Baxter demurred to thi s petition on t he ground that the court
had no jurisd iction of t he case; and afterward, on th e 15th of
April, the court, in the absence of t he defendant's counse l,
overrul ed the demurrer and without furth er pleading or any
evidence in the case rend ered judgment for Brooks in accordance with the prayer of .his petition. Brooks within a Jew
minutes thereafter, without process to enforce the execution of
said judgment and with th e aid of armed men, forcibly ejected
Baxter and took possession of the Governor's offi ce. On th e
next day aft~r th e judgment was rendered Bax ter's counsel

19
made a motion to set it aside, alleging among other things as
ground therefor that they were absieut when the demuner was
submitted and the final judgment thereon rendered ; that the
judgment of the court upon overruling tbe demurrer should have
been that the defendant answer over, instead of which a final
judgment was rendered without giving any time or opportunity
to answer the complaint upon its merits; tbat the court assessed
the damages without any jury or evidence, and finally that the
court had no jurisdiction over the subj ect matter of the suit;
but the next day this motion was overruled by the court. Section 4, article 4, of th e Constitution of tbe United States is as
follows: 'The United States shall guarantee to every State iu
this Union a republican torm of government, and shall protect
each of them against invasion, and ou application of the L egislature or of the Executive (wbeu t be Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic violence.' Wb eu in pursuance of
this provision of the Constitution th e Presi dent is call ed upon
by the Executive of a State to protect it against domestic violence, it appears to be his duty to give the required aid, and
especially when there is no doubt about the existence of the
domestic violence; but where two persons, each claiming to be
Govern.:,r, make calls respect ively upou the P resident und er
said clause of the Constitution, it of course becomes necessary
for him to determine iu the first place which of said persons is
the constitutional Governor of th e State. Th at section of th e
Constitution of Arkansas heretofore cited, in my opi nion, is
decisive of this question as between Baxter and Brooks. According to th e Constitution and la1Ys of the State the votes for
Governor were counted and Baxter declared elected, and was
at once duly inaugurated as Govern or of the State. T here is
great difficulty in holding that he usurped the office into which
be was inducted under t hese circumstances. Assumin g that
no greater effect is to be given to the counting of the votes
in presence of the General Assembly than ought to be giveu to
a similar aetiou by auy board of cauwssers, yet when it comes
to decide a question of contest the General Assembly is converted by the Constitution into " j udi cial body, and its judg-
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ment is as conclusive and final as t he j•1dgment of the Supreme
Court of th e State on any matter within its jurisdiction.
Parties to such a contest plead and produ ce evidence according
to the practice provided in such cases, and the controversy is
invested with form s and effect of a judicial procedure. When
t he peopl e of the State declared in their constitution that a
contest about State officers shall be determin ed by the General
Assembly, they cannot be understood as meaning it might be
determined in any circuit court of the State. To ~ay that a
contest shall be decided by decision, and then to say after the
decision is made that such contest is not determin ed but is as open
as it ever was, is a contradiction in terms. Can it possi bly be
su ppo:ed the framers of this Constituti on when they declared
contested elections about State officers, including the Governor,
shou ld be determ ined by the General Assembly, intended t hat
any such contest should be just as unsettled after as it was before such determin ation of it? Manifestly they intended to
create a special tribunal to try claims to th e high offices of t he
State. But the tribuna l is not special if the courts have concurrent jurisdiction over th e subj ect. Brooks appear, to claim
that when a contest for Governor is drcided by the General
Assem bly th e defeated party may treat the decision as a n ull ity
and proceed de novo iu the courts. This makes the coustitutioaal provi sion as to the contest of no effect, and the proceedings under it an empty form. Wh en the House of Representatives dism issed the petition of Brooks for a contest, it must be
taken as a decision of that body on questions presented in the
petition. B ut it is not of any consequence whether or not the
General Assem bl y has in fact decided the contest, if the exclusive
j ur isdiction to do so is vested in that body by the Constitution
and laws of the State. Section 4, of article 5, of the Constitution
of Arkansas, like most other constitutions, declares that each
house of the Assembly shall judge of the qualifications, election,
and retu rn of its members, and it has never been denied anywhere
that these words confer exclusive jurisdiction. But the terms, if
possibl e, are more comprehensi ve by wh ich the Constitution
confers upon the L egislative Assembly jurisdiction to judge of

the election of State officers. Doubtl ess t he makers of t he
Constitution considm·ed it unsafe to lodge in the hands of every
circui t court of t he State t he power to revolution ize the Executive Department at wi ll , and t heir will is forcibly iHu strated by
the case under consideration, in whi ch a person who had been
insta lled as Governor according to t he Constitution and laws
of the State after an undisturbed incumbency of more than a
year, is deposed by a Circui t Judge and another person put in
his pl ace upon the unsupported statement of the latter that he
had received a maj ori ty of votes at th e election. Lookin g at
the Constitution a lone it is perfect ly clear to my mind th at the
courts of th e State have no right to t ry a contest about th e
offi ce of Governor, but that exclusive jurisdiction over that
question is vested in t he General Assem bly. This view is
confir med by j udicial authority. Su mming up t he whol e discussion, the Supreme Court of Arkansas say in the case of t he
Attorney-Gen eral vs. Baxter above referred to, 'U od er this
Constitution th e determin ation of the question as to whether
the person exercisin g t he office of Governor bas beeu duly
elected or not is vested exclusively in th~ General Assemb ly of
ti:ie State, and neither this nor any other State court has j urisdiction to t ry a sni t in r elation to such contest, be the mode or
form what it may. Wheth er at the suit of th e Attorney-General or on the relation of a claiman t through him , or by an
indi vidu al a lone claimin g a rig ht to the office. S uch an issue
should be made before the General Assembly; it is their duty
to decide, and no other tribunal ca n determine that question.
We are of opinion that this court has no jurisdiction to hear
and deter mine a writ of quo warranto for th e purpose of ren dering a judgment of ouster aga in st th e Ch ief Executive of
thi s State and the right to fil e an information and issue a writ
for t hat purpose is denied.' Some effort bas been made to distinguish this case from that of Brooks vs. Baxter in the Circuit
Co urt by calli ng the opinion a dictum; bu t t be point presented
to and decided by the Suprem e Court was t hat in a contest for
th e office of Governor th e jurisdiction of the Genera l Assembly
was exclusive, wh ich, of course, deprived one court as much as
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another of the power to try such a contest. Th ere is, however
another decision made by the same court on the precise q uestio~
presented in the case of Brooks vs. Baxter. Berry was a candidate for State Auditor on the same ticket ,;ith Brooks.
Wh eeler, his competitor, was declared elected by the General
Assem bly. Berry then brought a suit nuder said section 525
in tbe Pulaski Circuit Court, to recover the office. Wheele;
applied to th e Supreme Court for an order to r estrain the proceedings, and that court issued a writ of µrobibirion forbi dding
the said court to proceed, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction in the case as to the question of law involved . The
casts of Berry and Brooks are exactly ali ke. That this Circuit
Court should lu~ve rendered a verdict fur Brooks under these
circumstances is surprising, aud it is not too much to say that
it presents a case of judicial insubordination which deserves
the reprehension of every one who does not wish to see public
confidence in the certainty and good faith of jndici~l proceedings wholly destroyed. Chief Justice McCl ure, who dissented
iu the case of the Attorney-General vs. Baxter, delivered the
opinion of th e court in the W heele1· case, in which he uses
the foll owing language: ' The majority of the court in the case
of the State vs. Baxter, under the delusion that quo warranto
and a contested election proceeding were convertible remedies
having one and the same object, decides that neither this nor
any other State court, no matter what the form of action, has
jurisdiction to try a . uit in relation to a contest for the office
of Goveruor. As an abstract proposition of law, I concede
th e correctness of the rul e, and would have assented to it if the
qu estion had heeu before us. The question now be/ore t his
court is precisely one of contest and nothing else. As to all
matters of contested elections for the offices of Governor,
Li eutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor, Treasu rer,
Attorney-General and Superintendent of Public Instruction, I
am of the opinion that it can only be had before the General
Assembly.'
"He then adds in conclusion: 'I think a writ of prohibition
ought to go to prohibit the Circui t Court from entertaining
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jurisdiction of that portion of Berry vs. Wheeler that has fo r
its object a recovery of the offic,e.' All five of the judges heard
this case, and there was no dissent from these views as to the
question of jnrisdiction. To show how the foregoing decisions
are understood in the State, I refer to a note by the Hon. H. C.
Caldwell, ,Judge of the United States Court for th e Eastern
District of Arkansas, upon sect ion 2:379 of the Digest of th e
Statu tes of' the State lately examined and approved by him ,
which is as follows: 'By the provisions of section 19, of article
4., of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the General Assem bly over cases of contested election for the officers in said
section enu merated is exclusi ve.' Attorney-General on the relation of B1·ooks v.s. Baxte,·, ]i[S. Op., 1873; Wheele,· v.s. Whytock, MS. Op., 187:J.'
"It is assumed in the argument. for Brooks that the judgment
of the Pu lask i Circuit Court is binding as well npoo the
President as upon Baxter un til it is reversed; but where tbere
are confli cting opinions, as in this case, the President is to.
prefer th at one which, in his opin ion, is warranted by the Constitu tion and laws of the Sta te. The General Assembly has
deeided that J3axter was elected. The Circuit Cou rt of P ulaski
county haa decid ed that Brooks was elected .
"Taking the provision of the Constitution wh ich declares
that contested elections about certain State officers, includ in g
the Governor, shall be determined by the General Assem bly,
and that provisi0n of the law heretofore cited which says that
all contes~ed elections of Govemor 8hal l be decided by the
L egislature, and t he two decisious of the Supreme Court
affh rning the exclusiv e jurisdiction of that body over the aubj ect, aud the concl usion i,wsi 0 tibly follows that such judgment
of the Ci rcuit Cou rt is void. A void judgment binds nobody.
Said section fi25, under which t.his jnugment was rendered
mu st be construed with" reference to the Constitution and othe;
statutes of the State, and is no cloubt intended to apply to
county and other inferior office1·s for which no provision elsewh ere is macle. But tht• Constitution takes the State officers
therei n enum erated out of th e purview of this sect ion a·nd
establishes a special trib un al to try these contested election
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cases to which thenare parti es. The jurisdiction of this tribunal is exclusive. Ohio vs. Grisel/ and ~Men/on, 15 Ohio, 114 ;
All01·ney-Gene,·a/ vs. Ga,·,·u911es, 28 P enn. , !) ; Uornrnonwealth
vs. Baxter, 3-5 ib., 263; Commonwealth vs. L eech, 44 •ib., 332.
RespectiDg the claim that Brooks received a majqrity of the
votes at the election , it must be sa id that the President bas no
way to verify that) claim. If' he bad it would not, in. my
opinion, under t he , circum stances of this case, be a proper
subject for bis considerat ion. Perhaps if everything about th e
election was in confusion a nd there had been no legal count of
the votes t he qu est ion of majorities might form au element of
discussion; but where, as in this case, there bas been a legal
count of the votes, and th e tribun al orga ni zed by th e Constitution of the State for t hat purpose has declared the election, the
Presid ent, in my judgment, ought not to go behind that action
to look into the state ;of th e vote. Frnuds may have been
committed there to t he prejudi ce of BL"Ooks, but unhapp ily
th ere are few elections where partisan zeal rnns high in wh ich
the victorious party, with more or less truth, is not charged
with acts of .fraud. There must, however, be an end to th e
controversy upon the subj ect. Somebody must be trusted to
couut votes and declare elections. U nconstitutiona l methods
of filling offices cannot be resorted to because there is some real
or imagin ed nn fairues about th e electiou. Ambitious aud
selfish aspiran ts for office gen erally create the d isturbance about
this matter, for the people are more interested iu th e preser vation of the peace than in the political fo rtun es ofo any man.
Eithe,· of th e contestant; with law and order is better than the
other with discord and v iole11 ce. I think it would be disastrous to allow the proceedin gs by which Brooks obtained possession of t he office to be drawn into a precedent. There is
not a State iu th e Union iu which tl)Jly would not prod uce a
conflict, nn d probably bloodshecl . Th ey cau11ot be uph eld or
justified upon any grnuud , aud in my opin ion Elisha Baxter
should be recognized as t he lawfu l Executiv~ of the State of
A r kansas.
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" S ince the fo regoing was writ.ten I have receiv ed a telegra phic
r·opy of what purport s to he a decision of th e Sup reme Co urt
of Arkan . as delivered on the 7th in~I., from which it appea rs
that the Auditor nf the State, upon tlw requis ition of Brooks,
drew hi s warr ant on th0 Tre:isurcr fo r the snm of one th ousand
doll ars, paymen t of which was refused. Brooks then appli ed
to th e Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus upon the
Treasurer, who set up by wav of defense t hat Broob was not
Go,·e rn or ·of th e State, tu which Brooks dernnrrcd, and thereupon the court say: 'Th e onl y qurstion we d eem it neccs,ar~·
to notice is, did the Circ ui t Cou rt hm·,, jurisdiction to ren der
the judgment in the rasr of Brnoks vs. B,ixter ? \Ve fee l some
deli cacy about exp ressing an opi11ion upon the question propounded, but und er the p leadings it ha~ to be passed upon
in cid entall y if not absolutely in deter minin g wh ether th e
rrlator is ent it led to t-l1 e rel ief asked, for his rig ht to the office
if estahlisb ecl at all , is <•sta blished by th e Circuit Court of
Pulaski county . W e :i re of opini on that the Circuit Court had
jurisd iction of the subj ect matter, and its judgment appears to
be regular and valid. Having arrived at these conclusions the
demurrer is overrul ed , and the \Vl'it of man dam us will be
awarded as prayed fo r.' To show th e value of this deci ion it
is proper that I shou ld make the following statement : On the
20th of April,Brnoks made a formal applieati on to the President
for aid to suppress domestic viol ence, which was accompanied
by a paper sig ned by Ch ief J ustiee McClu re and Justices
Searle and Stephenson, in which they stated that they recognized Brooks as Governor, and to this paper also is appended t.he
name of Page, th e respondent in th e above named proceeding
for mandamus. Pa ge, therefore, did not refuse to pay the
,Yarrant of the Auditor beca use he did not recog nize Brooks as
Governor, but the ol~ ect of his refusal evidently was to create
snch facts as were necessary to make a case for the Supreme
Court. According ly the plead ings were made up by the parties,
both of whom were on the same side in the contro,·ersy, and
th e issue so mad e was submitted to judges virtnally pledged to
give the decision wanted, an d there within the military en4
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ca mpment of Brook s th ey lrnni cd ly, but wi th delicacy, as they
say, decided that he is Governor, a decision in plain cont raycntion nf th e Constitution a11d laws of tl, e State and in direct
conflict with two other recen t deci.sions of th e sarne co urt
!leliberately mad e. 1 refrain fro m com ment. More tlian once
th e Sup,·eme Court ol' the Un ited States ha · decided th at it

cases in which this court has been asked to quash tbe indi ctments of an inferior court fo r want of jurisdiction, and they
were couuty cu urts.- in Bue/mer, ex pa,·le, above cited, and
1he/son et al. vs. J ejj'el'son County, opinion 1873, and th e remedy
asked in this case was re.fu sed in Jfockner, ex pa,·le, because
th e application was p1·emature.
Jf th e title to th e offi ce of Govern or had been determined in
Brook s' fa vor by a competent tribu nal, he might have sued iu
th e Pulaski Circuit Cou rt for his salary; but the rig ht lo this
is but an incident, and fo llows t he rig ht to t he office of Governor as tb e shad o,v follows the substa nce ; and before th e
P~lask i Circuit Court could , in th is case, take ju r isdiction of
th e incident, it must determine t he principal question, to- wit :
the right to the office. ·w e find, therefore, in this case, an
excess of jurisdiction in rend ering' a money judg ment. The
case can be distin g uished from that of Wheeler vs. l V7iytocl,,
wh erein this comt refu sed to prohibit th e court bel ow from
retaining the jurisd ict ion for th e sa lary, lea ving it there to be
progressed with wh en th e right to the office of Auditor, involved in that case, should be proper ly determ ined . Here the
court below as.•umed to decid e both. But if Wheeler vs. Whytocl, was in conflict with these views, we sh o,;j d not hesitate to
overrule it.
Findin g that the conrt below bad no jurisdiction over th e
subj ect matter of this suit, nor of any of its incidents, and
that its proceedings and judgment in this cause are void, th e
judgment must be qua hed.

would not hea r argument in a ca.se made np iu t his way, an d a

dec ision obtained under such circu111stances is not recogni zed as
authority by any res pectabl e tribuna l. No doub t this deci sion
will add to tli e Pomplicat ions
difficulti es of t he situation ,
bu t it does not affect ni y judgment as to the ri g ht of Baxter to
th e office of Governo r un til it is otherw ise d,,c,ded upon a con test nHHle by t he L egislature of tlic State. On th e 11th in st.
the Genera l Assemb ly ol the State was convened in ext ra
session upon th e cal l ot BJ xtcr, and h<1th ho uses pas eel a joint
resolutio n pursuan t to section ~, of article 4, of the Constitutio n
of tlie United States, calling upon the P, Psident to protect the
State against domestic viole11ce. Thi, ca ll exhausts all the
means wbich the peop le of th e State have under th e Constit ution to invoke the aicl of th e Executive of the United States
for Lh<'ir protect ion, and there seems to be, under th e circumsta nces of the case, an imperative n cessity for immediate
. action.
"I have th e honor to be, with g reat respsect,
'· GEORGE H. WILLIAMS,
" Attorney-General."

"'"I

\\'e will not attempt to add anythi ng to this opiniou, on th e
subj ect of jmisd ict ion .
\Ve have discussed t he r emedy so ught in this case, beca use
thi s is th e first tim e, sin ce this government began, in 1836,
that this court has been asked to remove a judgment of a circuit
court by certiorari and to quash it, for a want of jurisdiction .
Th e fact is a comp liment to the sk ill of the mak ers of our
several constitutions, who were abl e to free them from obscurity on th is question of jurisd iction, and is a tribute to t he
intelligeuce and integri ty of our j ud iciary. Th ere are but two

